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IS THERE FREEDOM IN HEAVEN?
James F. Sennett

This paper examines the dilemma of heavenly freedom. If there is freedom in
heaven, then it seems that there is the possibility of evil in heaven, which violates standard intuitions. If there is not, then heaven is lacking a good significant enough that it would justify God in creating free beings, despite the evil
they might cause. But then how can God be justified in omitting such a good
from heaven? To resolve this dilemma, T present the Proximate Conception of
freedom, which holds that actions may be free though determined, but only if
they have in their causal history some undetermined free actions by the same
agent. I show how this conception resolves the dilemma, defend it against
objections, and comment on its implications.

1. The Dilemma of Heavenly Freedom
Is there freedom in heaven? Regardless of how this question is answered, it
seems to lead to problems for traditional theism. These problems arise, in
part, because of the standard theistic response to the problem of evil known
as the "free will defense." The crux of this argument is the claim that it is
impossible for God to create a world in which there is both human freedom
and a guarantee of no evil.' So, according to the free will defense, human
freedom makes logical room for the existence of evil, even if God exists. 2
Therefore, if agents in heaven are free, then either there is the possibility of
evil in heaven or the free will defense fails (since it is possible that there be
freedom and a guarantee of no evil).3
However, traditional theism regards heaven as a place in which evil is
completely eradicated - it is not even possible that any should arise. 4 The
difference between heaven and earth is not simply that earth contains evil
while heaven does not. It has been concluded by the best free will defenders that it is possible that there be no evil, even with the presence of free
agents.' It is only the guarantee of no evil that the presence of freedom eliminates. If heaven is nothing more than a place where the possibility of freedom and no evil is realized, then the absence of evil in heaven is purely contingent on the choices of human beings, and not a matter of God's sovereignty or the nature of heaven at all. But the traditional view of heaven is
that it owes its purity to the unmediated presence of God. Heaven is essentially pristine, grounded in divine immanence, not contingently so due to
the fortunate choices of humans.
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Furthermore, if heaven is only evil-free contingent on the choices of its
human occupants, then it is constantly in danger of losing its evil-free status, since it is always in the power of those occupants to introduce evil into
heaven. But certainly the idea that heaven might yet become a place of sin
and rebellion is contrary to traditional theism. In order for heaven to be
essentially pristine and free from future corruption, it must be necessarily
evil-free - it cannot be possible for there to be evil."
The second option for those affirming freedom in heaven - that the free
will defense fails - is conceptually unproblematic. However, it is certainly
dialectically undesirable. It is arguable that the free will defense is the most
promising philosophical response to the so-called "logical argument from
evil" available. At the very least, the free will defense is an extremely
important theistic tool. It should be surrendered, if at all, only with great
fear and trepidation. If there is any way to avoid its loss, that way is prima
facie preferable.
So it seems that the theist should answer the question, "Is there freedom
in heaven?" with a resounding and unequivocal "No." Neither of the consequences of an affirmative answer - the possibility of evil in heaven nor
the failure of the free will defense - is desirable. But a negative answer
leads to disturbing consequences of its own. First, it can be argued that traditional theism is committed to the claim that agents in heaven are free. It is
clear that the tradition assumes that we will be basically the same people in
heaven that we are on earth. Though we may have resurrection bodies, be
transformed into the likeness of Christ, and the like, none of this will cause
us to lose our specific identities or divorce us in any important metaphysical
sense from the people we are on earth. But certainly being free is an important metaphysical property. Therefore, if we will not be free in heaven we
will indeed be divorced in some important metaphysical sense from the
people we are on earth. So, while it may not be obvious that the Western
theistic tradition explicitly endorses the view that agents in heaven are free,
it seems that the tradition is committed to such a view. At the very least, the
tradition would require some serious rethinking if we were to accept the
view that there is no freedom in heaven.
But a more important problem, from a philosophical standpoint at least,
awaits the one claiming that there is no freedom in heaven. Free will
defenders most often bolster the defense by arguing that human freedom
manifests a moral good significant enough to outweigh the evil that occurs
if it is permitted? Call this morally significant good the "freedom good." If
there is no freedom in heaven, then heaven is lacking the freedom good.
Now, if God can justifiably withhold the freedom good from heaven by
withholding freedom, then why could he not do so on earth? If he could
have justifiably withheld the freedom good from earth and thus avoided
the possibility of moral evil, then he is morally culpable for not doing so,
and the free will defense fails. Therefore, an answer of "no" to the question
of heavenly freedom causes as serious a problem for the free will defense as
does an answer of "yes."
So there is a dilemma - what I will call the dilemma of heavenly freedom. If
there is freedom in heaven, then there are serious philosophical problems.
If there is no freedom in heaven, then there are serious philosophical prob-
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lems. However, I believe that a path can be successfully navigated between
the horns of this dilemma. Furthermore, the solution I propose involves
some significant theses concerning the conception of human freedom in
general, and is therefore of interest beyond the confines of this dilemma. I
will say a word or two concerning these theses at the close of this paper.

2. Compatibilism and the Dilemma
The dilemma of heavenly freedom results from the fact that freedom is
interpreted in a libertarian sense - whether or not an agent performs a free
action is causally undetermined. Hence, whether or not evil will result from
those actions is causally undetermined, and no one - not even God - can
guarantee that freedom will not result in evil.
So perhaps one could escape the dilemma by opting for a compatibilist or
soft determinist view of freedom. s On this view, all that is required for an
action to be free is that there be no coercion, artificial manipulation, or any
other interference with the agent's normal decision-making processes. Such
a view of freedom is consistent with determinism. Free actions must simply
be determined in the right sort of way. Hence, it is consistent with the claim
that heaven contains free agents who cause no evil. All that is required is
that the appropriate causal structures be sufficient to result in all agents in
heaven freely choosing good on all occasions.
Unfortunately, this solution also affords unsavory consequences. If God
can avoid evil in heaven with compatibilist freedom, it seems that he could
exercise the same option on earth, thereby avoiding evil all together. I
argued a few years ago in this same journal that the free will defense entails
a libertarian view of freedom - if it is true, or even possible, that all free
actions are determined, then God bears some moral responsibility for the
evil there is." So an attempt to resolve the dilemma of heavenly freedom by
adopting compatibilism encounters the same problem as the original dilemma; viz., it wreaks havoc with the free will defense.
Despite this difficulty, however, I will argue that there is a compatibilist
conception of freedom that can solve the dilemma of heavenly freedom.
The problems just alluded to corne about only if one insists that freedom is
compatibilist both in heaven and on earth - that is, that all free actions are
determined. But if there is a way to argue that heaven has only compatibilist freedom while earth includes at least some libertarian freedom, then
the pitfalls can be avoided. lO This is my strategy.
Such a strategy will strike many as obviously incoherent. Compatibilism
and libertarianism are, it is most often supposed, conceptual contradictories.
Freedom is either one or the other. It cannot be both, or sometimes one and
sometimes the other. Besides, even if it could be, it is unclear how this
solves any problems. God would still have had the option of making all
freedom compatibilist, and thus avoiding evil while retaining freedom.
Nonetheless, I will argue that the most plausible notion of compatibilist
freedom is not only one with which libertarian freedom is consistent, but
one for which libertarian freedom is a necessary condition. Hence, while
God can have only compatibilist freedom in heaven, with its guarantee of
no evil, he can do so only by surrendering such luxury on earth.
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3. The Consequence Argument and Proximate Determinism

I begin with a standard argument against a popular conception of compatibilism - an argument best articulated and defended by Peter van
Inwagen. Following van Inwagen, I will call it the Consequence Argument.
He summarizes the argument thus: "If determinism is true, then our
actions are the consequences of laws of nature and events in the remote
past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, neither is it
up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequence of these
things are not up to us." 1I
I find this argument compelling and will, for the balance of this paper,
assume that it is sound. However, I think there has been confusion over
exactly what the argument proves if it is sound. It is very natural to see it as
an argument to the conclusion that the notions free action and determined
event are incompatible - no event can bear both properties. But the notion
determined event is ambiguous. To clear up this ambiguity, I introduce the
concepts of proximate determination and remote determination.
An event is remotely determined just in case the laws of nature and the
state of the world at any given time prior to the event entail that the event will
occur. (That is, for every time t prior to time t* at which the event occurs,
the laws of nature and the state of the world at t entail the occurrence of the
event at t*.) An event is proximately determined just in case the laws of nature
and the state of the world at some time immediately prior to the event entail
that the event will occur. (For the sake of simplicity, I will ignore the technical difficulties inherent in specifying a notion such as time t immediately prior
to time t*. The intuitive notion is clear enough for my purposes - that there
is a time t prior to t* such that t is sufficiently close in time to t·· to render
any identification of times after t and before t* irrelevant.) An event is
remotely undetermined just in case there is some time in the past such that the
laws of nature and the state of the world at that time do not entail that the
event will occur. An event is proximately undetermined just in case there is no
time in the past such that the laws of nature and the state of the world at
that time entail that the event will occur. i2
Any remotely determined event is proximately determined. However,
there is conceptual room for an event that is proximately determined and
remotely undetermined. The Consequence Argument entails only that no
free action is remotely determined. It does not entail that there are no proximately determined free actions. More specifically, the Consequence
Argument entails that
For every free action A, either
(i)
A is proximately undetermined; or
(ii) A has in its causal history some proximately undetermined
event such that it is up to the agent in question whether or not
the undetermined event occurs (Le., a libertarian free action).
The proximately undetermined events referred to in (ii) above may have
occurred quite far back in the past. The Consequence Argument entails
absurdity only in the notion of a free action with no agent control (in the lib-
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ertarian sense that the agent is not determined to perform the action) at any
time in the past. Therefore, the notion of a free action over which there is no
agent control at the time it is performed, but which is such that there must
be agent controlled events in the past that led to the determination of the
event, is not ruled absurd.lJ That is, the argument allows for proximately
determined free actions whose causal histories contain proximately undetermined free actions by the same agent. 14

4. The Proximate Conception of Freedom
It is standard compatibilist procedure to insist that free actions are those
that are determined by relevant intentional states of the agent - by some
appropriate combination of or interaction among her volitions, desires,
goals, etc. For the sake of simplicity I will refer to such a phenomenon as an
action being determined by the agent's character. It is important to note,
however, that I am not committing to any particular psychological or mental states comprising the character. Any compatibilist view that appeals to
an intentional criterion for free action (a feature shared by virtually all significant views) is susceptible to the kinds of points I will raise. Therefore,
any of these criteria can be subsumed under the notion of acting "from
character."
For all such theories, it is how an action is determined that specifies it as
free. It must be determined by the agent's character, and not by any illegitimate interference from external forces. It must not be the handiwork of a
Cartesian demon, evil neurosurgeon, or brain washing interrogator. It must
not be performed at gun point or under any other threat of danger. The
agent's character must determine what the agent will do at the time she acts
freely - not any factors independent of that character. But, the story goes, it
is perfectly acceptable that one's character itself be causally determined to
be what it is. The facts and events of one's heritage, environment, upbringing, etc., may together necessitate the character from which she freely acts.
So when an agent claims to have done something "of her own free will,"
she need not be claiming that it was causally contingent that she do what
she did. It need only be the case that no causal structures independent of
her character determined her action. She and she alone (i.e., her character)
provided the causal structure sufficient to determine her action.
I will concede the coherence of the notion of free actions determined by
character. In fact, I find such a notion quite compelling at times. When I
think of Martin Luther declaring before the Diet at Worms, "Here I stand;
I cannot do otherwise," I sense the power of an immovable spirit bound to
act from character in the face of great external pressures to do otherwiseY
I understand the action to be free, though so bound - indeed, I understand
it to be free, in part, because it is so bound. I can, with little reservation,
agree to the claim that there is a coherent notion of determined freedom,
and that something like acting from character is a necessary condition for
such freedom.
But this cannot be a sufficient condition for a determined action's being
free. Even if an action is determined by character, it will not be free if the
character by which it was determined has been illegitimately influenced by
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coercion or manipulation. If Luther's refusal to recant is true to his character, but his character was formed through brain washing or Cartesian
demonic influence, his action is not free.
In Aldous Huxley's anti-utopian novel Brave New World, genetic manipulation was used to lead to character formation for virtually all citizens.
Because of this manipulation, the people chose the lifestyles th~ government
intended them to choose, no matter how menial, and desired no others. It is
canonical to view these people - and it was certainly Huxley's intention that
we view them - as quintessentially unfree. The manipulation of their characters, over which they had no control, disqualified their actions as free even though the actions were determined by the agents' characters. It is not
enough that an action be caused appropriately; it must also be determined
by a character that has been fonned appropriately.'6
What does it take for a character to be formed appropriately? There are
many possible suggestions, and it is not my intention to name, defend, or
refute any of them. I wish here only to note that we have begun a causal
regression that should remind us of the dangers signaled by the
Consequence Argument. Any suggestions for appropriate charader formation will invoke either all determined events or some undetermined events.
If the latter are invoked, the determinist thesis is compromised. If the former are invoked, it could then be argued that those events alone are not sufficient for appropriate character formation. The circumstances in which
those events occurred could have been different in such a way as to constitute illegitimate character formation. This contingency could be accommodated only by moving further back in time to specify conditions necessary
to assure that the future events leading to character formation are appropriate. Thus, a regressive pattern is established that must either end in undetermined events under the control of the original agent (i.e., libeliarian free
actions) or take us back to events occurring before the birth of the agent (as
in the case of the Brave New World citizens), in which case we nm into the
Consequence Argument.'7
So those moved by the Consequence Argument will conclude that determination by character is insufficient to make a determined action free. And
the missing necessary condition must involve undetermined free actions by
the same agent in order to avoid the incoherence outlined in the
Consequence Argument. The most natural explanation for this is that an
agent must be responsible for his character formation - choosing it by performing certain undetermined free actions at certain points in his life. A
character that is libertarian freely chosen is the only kind of character that
can determine compatibilist free actions."
What I have in mind is this: many of the character traits we display honesty, for example, or courage or rudeness or punctuality - were formed
in us as a result of consistent behavior patterns that developed into habit.
These behaviors were not always habitual, but began as overt, deliberate
actions, perhaps taken after not a little pondering and soul searching. So
one may be an honest and dependable person today because at critical
points earlier in her life she decided to behave in honest and dependable
ways. Perhaps she now is so practiced in the art of probity that she
responds with ingenuousness and veracity without hesitation or fore-
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thought. Her character demands and determines that she do so. But she
could not have reached such a state had she not deliberately chosen honestly from among genuine alternatives in the past. My assertion here is that
her current determined acts of honesty can be labeled 'free' without running afoul of the Consequence Argument only provided that they have in
their causal past certain libertarian free actions - viz, the deliberately chosen
acts of honesty that led to the development of the character trait. 19
Of course, this scenario is open to the charge that these precedent deliberate actions were themselves the determinate product of her character as it
stood at that time, and so the standard compatibilist position would insist.
But again such a response would suggest a regression that will inevitably
lead back to before her birth, and the Consequence Argument again threatens. I will call this conception of compatibilist freedom - under which compatibilist free actions are causally dependent on libertarian free actions - the
Proximate Conception. Therefore, there is a consistent ontology of free
actions under which there are compatibilist free actions that do not violate
the Consequence Argument.

5. The Resolution of the Dilemma
I have made two substantive philosophical claims. First, there is a conception of compatibilist freedom that is consistent with - indeed entails libertarian freedom: compatibilist free actions are proximately determined
actions whose causal histories include proximately undetermined free
actions by the same agent. Second, the standard compatibilist doctrine of
free actions as those determined by the agent's character escapes the
Consequence Argument only if the agent's character was formed, at least in
part, by proximately undetermined free actions by the same agent. I submit
that the most plausible way to think about compatibilist free actions is as
those proximately determined by the agent's character, but remotely undetermined, since the character is remotely undetermined. In this section I
will outline how the Proximate Conception resolves the dilemma of heavenly freedom.
First, the Proximate Conception allows for freedom in heaven with no
possibility of evil. If all free actions in heaven are proximately determined,
all that is required is that the characters determining them be formed in
such a way as to determine no actions that cause evil. Nevertheless, the
danger in the suggestion of compatibilist freedom rehearsed in the second
section of this paper is avoided. Since proximately determined actions are
free only if the agent performed some libertarian free actions in the past,
there must be the possibility of evil at some time in the past in order for
there to be any compatibilist free actions in the present. The dilemma of
heavenly freedom is resolved if all libertarian free actions contributing to
the characters of agents in heaven were performed while those agents were
on earth. That is, the characters are formed on earth, but those characters
determine only actions for good once the agents enter heaven. 2o
The Proximate Conception can also avoid the charge that the lack of possibility of evil in heaven entails that heaven lacks the freedom good - the
kind of moral good critical to the free will defense. Consider the conception
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of general freedom. A world segment includes general freedom just in case
that segment includes libertarian freedom or (proximate) compatibilist freedom. It can be argued, consistent with the free will defense, that it is general freedom, not libertarian freedom per se, that manifests the freedom good.
Either libertarian freedom or (proximate) compatibilist freedom is sufficient
for general freedom. Thus, any world segment excluding libertarian freedom but including (proximate) compatibilist freedom is a world segment
manifesting the freedom good.
One way to argue this would be to suggest that the freedom good is the
potential or actual possession of character formed by the self - the ability to
become and be the person we choose to be. If this is the freedom good, it is
clearly manifested by both libertarian and proximate compatibilist freedom.
Hence, the freedom good is not absent from heaven, though libertarian freedom is. One might also suggest that the freedom good is the potential for
or actual possession of a certain God-like quality - the quality of self-determined righteousness. Again, this good is manifested by both libertarian
and proximate compatibilist freedom, and hence is also present in heaven
though libertarian freedom is absent. I believe that either of these goods
(and they are not unrelated) is a prime candidate for the freedom good, and
can certainly play the role called for by the free will defense. 21
So any world segment in which conditions for general freedom are satisfied is a segment that includes the freedom good. Since heaven is such a
world segment, it does not lack the freedom good. Since the presence of
proximate compatibilist freedom entails only that there be libertarian free
actions in the same world, and not in the same world segment, there need
be no libertarian free actions in heaven in order for the freedom good to be
manifesU2
The last point to note concerning the dilemma of heavenly freedom is
that the Proximate Conception leaves room for the success of the free will
defense. Proximate compatibilist freedom in heaven necessitate~; libertarian
freedom at some time in the past. Given the provision mentioned above
that all libertarian free actions determining the characters of agents in heaven are performed on earth, it follows that the presence of freedom at any
time requires the possibility of evil at some time, which is what the free will
defense requires.

6. Responses to a Few Objections
In this section I will address several important objections that have been
raised against the points of this paper. First, it has been suggested that the
threatened absence of some significant good in heaven does not necessarily
forebode a dilemma.23 After all, unless all significant goods are logically
compatible, they cannot all be present anywhere - even in heaven.
Furthermore, it may well be that certain sensory pleasures would not be
present in heaven, as well as goods dependent on the presence of suffering,
want, or some other evil- compassion, sympathy, sacrifice, and the like.
I concede all of these points. However, the point generating the dilemma of heavenly freedom is not simply that there is some significant good
lacking in heaven. 21 Rather, the point is that the significant good lacking is
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one such that, according to the free will defense, God is relieved of moral
blame for the evil in the world because he could not avoid the possibility
of the evil without removing the source of the good (human freedom).
The problem then, is this: if God could justifiably remove the good from
heaven by removing freedom, then why could he not do so on earth? If
he could have, then he is morally culpable for not doing so, and the free
will defense fails. The Proximate Conception allows that the good manifested by libertarian freedom be present in heaven, though there is no libertarian freedom there. Yet the problem just elucidated does not arise,
because even though God has the option to avoid libertarian freedom in
heaven, he does not have that option on earth. If there is to be an essentially evil-free heaven at all, there must be a pre-heaven segment of the
same world containing the possibility of evil.
Second, I have been asked if it even makes sense to call proximately
determined actions free at all. After all, the agent could not have done otherwise, at least in the sense that vindicates libertarianism and gives rise to the
Consequence Argument. Hence, those sympathetic to libertarianism and
the Consequence Argument, to whom my paper allegedly appeals, will not
be inclined to accept the Proximate Conception. 25
This objection raises a fascinating point concerning proximately determined actions, especially in light of the kinds of issues that normally surround the free will! determinism debate. While it is true that the agent
could not have done otherwise in the relevant sense, it is also true that the
agent can nonetheless be held morally responsible for proximately determined actions - even in the sense that libertarians claim soft determinism
cannot account for. If agent S is determined by his character to do A, and
the relevant part of his character was formed by the performance of libertarian free actions by S in the past, then it makes sense to charge that the moral
responsibility accruing to those libertarian free actions transfers through the
character to A. S can legitimately be rewarded or punished for A, even
though it was proximately determined. For example, if I am rude or dishonest literally by "force of habit," so that I no longer have libertarian control over my obnoxious or larcenous behavior, I can nonetheless be held
morally (and criminally) responsible for it, because I developed these habits
through libertarian free choices I made throughout my life. But given the
standard assumption that I am morally responsible for actions only if I am
free in performing them, it follows that my actions are free, even though I
could not have done otherwise in the sense that motivates libertarianism.26
Finally, I have been asked repeatedly if my position entails a rather stringent doctrine of salvation; viz., that only those who have lived long enough
and worked hard enough to develop a character that fully determines
actions for the good will be allowed into heaven. I do not believe it does.
There is room for some kind of doctrine of sanctification, whereby God supplies upon our deaths whatever is lacking in our character formations to
bring us to the state of compatibilist free perfection. I believe this can be
worked out consistently by insisting that it is the pattern we establish
throughout a life of persistent intentional character building that is critical not our actually attaining the desired character itself in our lifetimes. By
establishing such a pattern we are, in effect, giving God permission to fill in
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the gap. TIus is a highly complex matter, and one that must await a fully
developed theological encounter with the Proximate Conception for complete explication. For the time being, however, I will claim only that it is not
apparent to me that it cannot be made consistent with standard Christian
views of salvation and sanctification.

7. The Proximate Conception in Broader Context
I wish in closing to point out two further advantages to the Proximate
Conception - one philosophical and one theological. The theological
advantage is that the Proximate Conception is compatible with and suggestive of a traditional line of thinking regarding the relationship between life
on earth and life in heaven. In theistic circles life on earth is often viewed as
a proving and training ground for life in heaven. The choices made for
good or evil are directly relevant to the eternal destinies they determine for
us. As we form our characters, we set our spiritual compass for that location in which the lives we desire for ourselves are most fully and naturally
realized. Furthermore, for those who "choose life," earthly living is a time
of training and honing of our benevolent and aretaic skills, so that upon
entering heaven we are prepared for a life of compatibilist moral perfection,
where our very natures compel us to choose only the good - infallibly and
freely. Such a state is attainable, but only if we choose, free from any compulsion, to develop that character that will guarantee such a state.
The philosophical advantage of the Proximate Conception I wllsh to mention is wholly independent of the dilemma of heavenly freedom. The
Proximate Conception provides a link between compatibilism and libertarianism that softens the hard line commonly perceived to divide the two doctrines. Earlier I noted that libertarianism and compatibilism are traditionally thought of as conceptual contradictories - if one is true, the other must
be false. The Proximate Conception removes this incompatibility and
replaces it with a significant conceptual dependence.
I believe that the Proximate Conception can help to account for many of
the conflicting intuitions that make both compatibilism and libertarianism
appealing in the right conceptual contexts. Of course, a driving intuition
behind many compatibilist arguments is a desire to retain complete physical determinism. The Proximate Conception will do notillng to alleviate the
fears of those unwilling to allow the universe some elbow room. Neither
will it steady the nerves of those motivated to compatibilism by what I take
to be the false dilemma of determinism and randomness - the Humean
charge that undetermined actions are sheerly random, and hence cannot
qualify as free. For those haunted by tills bugbear, I can only urge reconsideration of the libertarian alternatives. However, for libertarians who, like
me, are struck by the plausibility of many of the points made by the compatibilist camp, the Proximate Conception offers hope for squaring the intuitions stirred by such suggestions with the undeniable - though undeniably
puzzling - fact of undetermined freedom. 27
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NOTES
1. The literature on this subject is, of course, enormous. A collection of much
of the most important material recently produced is provided in Robert M. and
Marilyn M. Adams, editors, The Problem of Evil (Oxford University Press, 1990).
For an excellent survey of the debate from an atheistic perspective, see Michael
Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1990), pp. 363-391. Perhaps the finest and most sophisticated development of the
free will defense to date is offered by Alvin Plantinga in The Nature of Necessity
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), ch. 9, and God, Freedom, and Evil (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 7-64. See also my Modality, Probability, and Rationality:
A Critical Examination of Alvin Plantinga's Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1992),
ch.3.
2. It only allows for evil, however. It is logically consistent to assume that free
agents always choose the good, hence never engender any evil. It is this assertion
that fuels J. L. Mackie's important criticism of the free will defense in "Evil and
Omnipotence," Mind 64 (1955); reprinted in Nelson Pike, ed., God and Evil
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 41-67. (Though Mackie assumes a
compatibilist conception of free will, the claim is consistent even with libertarianism.) It is a special strength of Plantinga's free will defense (see n. 1 above) that it
succeeds in spite of Mackie's objection. See Modality, Probability, and Rationality,
pp. 53-62, for a critical analysis of the debate between Mackie and Plantinga.
3. It has become canonical in the literature to distinguish between defense
and theodicy in the problem of evil. While the latter attempts to present a genuine
explanation for God's allowing evil, the former has a much more modest task. A
defense attempts only to show that it is pOSSible that God and evil coexist by
sketching out a coherent scenario under which both do exist. A defense makes no
claim that the scenario is actual- its possibility is enough to accomplish the task at
hand.
So construed, the free will defense does not assume that the actions of free
beings actually do explain the evil in the world, or even that there are any free
beings at all. It is clear, however, that traditional Christianity does assume that
there are free moral beings, and that they are responsible for at least some of the
evil in the world. Hence it is easy in discussions of the free will defense for the line
between the mere possibility of freedom-produced evil and its actuality to become
blurred. I have taken precautions to keep this line distinct, but discover on practically every rereading another technical inaccuracy. This is due, in part, to the fact
that I am raising the question of whether or not there can be any freedom in heaven, given that there is freedom on earth. This causes me to dance very close to the
line and even occasionally step across it. Nevertheless, it should be clear from the
discussion that it is not simply free will as a theodicy that is stake here, but the free
will defense itself - the dilemma threatens that it may not even be possible for God
justifiably to permit free will and the evil it threatens. I beg the reader's indulgence as the line between defense and theodicy alternately blurs and sharpens
throughout the paper. I am certain that there is no place where any blurring of the
line compromises the central arguments of the paper.
4. Some theists claim that evil did once arise in heaven, when Satan and his
armies rebelled against God and were cast out. At least two responses are available. First, traditional theism in no way entails the story of a Satanic fall, and there
are serious questions about whether or not it even represents good biblical exegesis. (A seminary professor of mine once remarked that we owe our conception of
Satan much more to John Milton than to any biblical sources.) Second, one might
accept the story, yet maintain that the fall of Satan constitutes the final eradication
of evil from heaven, so that, consequent to his expulsion, no evil can ever arise
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again. This line is perhaps representative of most theists who accept the story of
the fall of Satan, and still leads to the dilemma that will be explicated.
5. See note 2 above.
6. It would be more accurate to say that it cannot be within the ability of any
non-divine occupants of heaven to bring it about that there is evil in heaven. This
claim is still consistent with the modal claim that it is metaphysically possible that
there be evil in heaven, yet gives rise to the dilemma. However, thio: is a level of
precision that would unduly complicate a secondary point. In a paper that will
virtually swim in technicalities, I will take advantage of this one opportunity to
sacrifice accuracy for the sake of clarity.
7. While this claim is not, strictly speaking, necessary to the success of the
defense, free will defenders most often see the need to go beyond the bare bones
claim that the existence of God and the existence of evil are shown to be consistent
by the possibility of free will. This need arises because of the rejoinder that God
could never make such free beings, since they might cause evil, and he would bear
some moral responsibility for any such evil. This rejoinder is usually met by
claims concerning the moral value of freedom similar to those presented in the
text. Without such development, the free will defense lacks the dialectically essential element that God would, in some possible world, allow the possibility of evil
by creating free beings.
This move is prominent throughout Plantinga's treatment. Plantinga focuses
on the moral good that can only be done if people freely choose to perform certain
actions. Early in his defense, Plantinga gives "a preliminary statement of the Free
Will Defense" thus: "A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free (and freely prefer more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else
being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all" (Nature of Necessity, p.
166). Later in his discussion he characterizes the free will defense claim as "God is
omnipotent and it was not within his power to create a world containing moral
good but no moral evil" (p. 184). Finally, at the end of his discussion, he notes, "Of
course, it is up to God whether to create free creatures at all; but if he aims to produce
moral good, then he must create significantly free creatures upon whose cooperation he must depend" (p. 190, emphasis mine).
8. In 'The Free Will Defense and Determinism," Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991):
341, Tmake a modal distinction between soft determinism and compatibilism.
While both assert the compatibility of determinism and freedom, only the soft
determinist commits to the actuality of either. Hence it is possible to be a compatibilist, yet hold that determinism is in fact false, or that there are in fact no free
actions, or even that there are in fact free actions that are not determined. I also
distinguish between weak and strong compatibilism. The former has all these
options open, while the latter commits to the necessary truth of If there are any free
actions, they are determined, and thus does not have the final option open. As will be
seen, the present paper is, in part, a presentation of a weak compatibilist conception that entails that there are some undetermined free actions.
9. 'The Free Will Defense and Determinism," pp. 340-353.
10. This conclusion is still consistent with my argument in "The Free Will
Defense and Determinism," though the conclusion of the latter needs to be stated
more specifically: the free will defense entails that there are some libertarian free
actions if there are any free actions at all. But the compatibilist conception I will
argue for here also entails this claim.
11. An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 16. Van Inwagen
offers three highly sophisticated versions of this argument in chapter three of his
book, and defends them against many objections. For substantive rejoinders to
this argument, see John Fischer, "Van Tnwagen on Free Will," Philosophical
Quarterly 36 (1986): 252-260 and Terrance Horgan, "Compatibilism and the
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Consequence Argument," Philosophical Studies 47 (1985): 339-356.
12. I take it as obvious that, if there is a time t prior to t*, such that the laws of
nature and the state of the world at t entail that E occurs at time t*, then the laws of
nahlre and the state of the world at every time subsequent to t and prior to t*
entail that E occurs at t*. Therefore, if there is no time in the immediate past at
which the event is determined to occur, then there is no time in the past at all at
which the event is determined to occur.
13. Libertarian extraordinaire Robert Kane argues for just such a conception of
free will. (111e Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996;
see, e.g., pp. 73-78.) While I developed the ideas of this paper before examining
Kane's work, it is quite reassuring to find so important a voice in the free
willi determinism debate agreeing with me.
14. Note that it is necessary that at least some of the undetermined events in
the action's causal history be free actions performed by the same agent. If a proximately determined action could have only indeterminate causal elements that are
either not free actions or free actions performed by some other agent, then it could
be easily argued - analogous to the Consequence Argument - that such an action
is no more "up to" the agent than a remotely determined action.
15. According to church historian Roland Bainton, this famous saying of
Luther's is missing from the transcription of the trial at Worms, and it is questionable whether or not Luther actually said it. Like Bogart's "Play it again, Sam," or
Mae West's "Why don't you come up and see me sometime?" Luther may have
become identified with an epithet for which he was not responsible. Nevertheless,
the remark undoubtedly reflects Luther's sentiments, and its rhetorical force
remains for the purposes of this paper. (Qualifications such as this are the price
we inevitably pay for allowing historians access to so precious a commodity as
cultural myth).
16. The Brave Nev.} World brand of control is what Kane labels "covert, nonconstraining control." He sites Huxley in his explication, but concentrates on the
control exerted in B. F. Skinner's novel Walden Two (Kane, pp. 64f). Kane acknowledges that there is a brand of freedom that the inhabitants of the brave new world
and Walden colony possess, but argues that it is not the kind of freedom that
allows for ultimate moral responsibility.
17. Needless to say, this argument is far too brief and assumes far too much.
However, fleshing it out is well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say
that this paper is addressed primarily to those who share my affinity for the
Consequence Argument, yet who find the implications of a strictly libertarian doctrine of freedom bothersome when they consider either the Luther-type cases of
apparently determined freedom or the implications of libertarianism and the free
will defense for the question of freedom in heaven. In short, the paper is for those
who believe the dilemma is real, and this would rule out compatibilists unmoved
by the Consequence Argument.
18. Kane develops a similar notion in great detail in chapter five of The
Significance of Free Will. He argues that a condition he calls "Ultimate
Responsibility" is necessary in the causal history of my free actions, and an agent
is ultimately responsible for an action only if the action is undetermined.
19. Kane calls these "Self-Forming Actions," and holds that they are the
actions for which Ultimate Responsibility is a necessary condition (see above note).
20. Notice, incidentally, that it is a consequence of this position that heaven per
se cannot be a possible world. It can only be a part, or segment, of some world in
which there is libertarian freedom in some other segment that does not include
heaven. However, this consequence holds little danger for traditional theism,
since heaven in normally thought of as a segment of the actual world, and not a
possible world in itself. For an argument to the conclusion that heaven is not a
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possible world and implications of such a conclusion for theism, see Donald
Erlandson and Charles Sayward, "Is Heaven a Possible World?" International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1981): 55-58.
21. Even more to the point is Plantinga's suggestion that the existence of any
moral good at all is dependent on the existence of "significant" freedom. In this
case the freedom good would simply be the conglomeration of all moral good.
Under the Proximate Conception, moral good can be accomplished even through
proximately determined actions, provided they are remotely undetermined.
Note, by the way, that Plantinga's conception of the freedom good makes the
case that there must be freedom in heaven even stronger. If there is no freedom in
heaven, then there is no moral good in heaven - a suggestion bordering on the
ludicrous.
22. One might object that my use of the notion of manifestation of good won't
do. Libertarian freedom just is a significant good, and if it is missing, so is the
good. My only reply to this position is that it gives rise to the dilemma of heavenly freedom, while my approach resolves it. Furthermore, my approach does not
seem to sacrifice any of the philosophical import of the identification of libertarian
freedom with good - most notably, it still supplies the necessary philosophical fuel
to power the free will defense.
Michael Gorman has suggested a rather clever alternative response to this
objection. Perhaps, though libertarian freedom is a significant good, proximate
compatibilist freedom is even better. So, if God (per impossible) could create earth
with only the latter, he would. Since proximate compatibilist freedom requires libertarian freedom at some prior time, the best world God could create would contain not a heaven and earth with libertarian freedom, but an earth with libertarian
freedom and a heaven with proximate compatibilist freedom. Thus, God permits
libertarian freedom on earth not only to provide a significant good on earth, but
also to make a greater good possible in heaven.
23. This objection was raised by Philip Quinn in written comments.
24. In fairness to Quinn (see above note), I must point out that in earlier drafts
I equivocated on this point. I cleared up the ambiguity and developed the position
that follows as a result of pondering Quinn's original objection.
25. This objection was raised in conversation by Tim O'Connor, and subsequent discussion with him aided greatly in my proposed solution.
26. So, interestingly enough, if the Proximate Conception of freedom is coherent, then it is indeed possible for 5 to be free in performing A, even though 5 could
not have done other than A - a conclusion quite significant for the general debate
over free will and determinism. Robert Kane argues that it is the matter of ultimate responsibility, not simply of "could have done otherwise," that is at stake in
the Consequence Argument (pp. 75-78).
27. I thank Keith Cooper, Timothy O'Connor, and Mel Stewart for very helpful discussions on previous drafts of this paper. Previous versions were read and
discussed before the philosophy department at Pacific Lutheran University, at the
1992 Intermountain Meetings of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Brigham
Young University, at a colloquy sponsored by the Palm Beach Atlantic College
philosophy club, and at the 1992 American Philosophical Association Eastern
Division Meetings in Washington, D.c. I thank participants in all of these forums
for their helpful comments and questions. I offer special thanks to Philip Quinn
for characteristically helpful and lucid prepared comments at the AP A meetings.
Finally, I thank Bill Wainwright and two anonymous referees for Faith and
Philosophy for final refining comments that helped bring this paper (at long last!) to
publishable form.

